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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys legal ethics decisions of the Georgia appellate

courts for a period from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009.'

The cases

concern discipline of lawyers, ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial

conduct, contempt, attorney fees, suits against lawyers, and a few
miscellaneous matters.

II.
A.

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

Diligence and Communication

During the survey period, the justices of the Georgia Supreme Court
agreed upon the discipline of twelve lawyers who failed to act diligently
for, or effectively communicate with, one or more clients. Ten lawyers
were unanimously disbarred or voluntarily surrendered their licenses as
a result primarily or exclusively of client abandonment.2 Two lawyers

* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Director of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of Sussex
(M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. For analysis of Georgia legal ethics law during the prior survey period, see Patrick
Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 237
(2008).
2. In re Hayes, 285 Ga. 400, 677 S.E.2d 132 (2009) (abandoned two clients in one
personal injury case); In re Hanes, 285 Ga. 293, 676 S.E.2d 167 (2009) (abandoned client
and practiced law while suspended, with one instance of prior discipline); In re Deckle, 285
Ga. 47, 673 S.E.2d 234 (2009) (abandoned two cases); In re Shinall, 285 Ga. 31, 673 S.E.2d
233 (2009) (abandoned one case); In re Clark, 284 Ga. 857, 672 S.E.2d 663 (2009)
(abandoned four matters); In re Elkins, 284 Ga. 869, 672 S.E.2d 662 (2009) (abandoned one
matter and had five prior disciplinary infractions); In re Frazier, 284 Ga. 443, 667 S.E.2d
615 (2008) (voluntary surrender of license and one case of client abandonment); In re Levy,
284 Ga. 281, 664 S.E.2d 195 (2008) (abandoned four matters).
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received suspensions, without dissent. Michael Anthony Edmunds
admitted to multiple violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct-namely Rule 1.4's3 requirement of communication with
clients-although it did not appear that he totally abandoned any
clients.4 The court noted that it appeared the lawyer did not harm his
clients and that his problems arose from his divorce, alcoholism, and
depression.6 Edmunds received a three-year suspension with conditions
on reinstatement." Stephen Lee Stincer received a public reprimand
and a one-month suspension for lack of diligence and misrepresentation
to the court in a federal case.7 The court noted in mitigation that at the
time of his infractions, Stincer was under intense stress and suffered
from extreme anxiety and panic attacks for which he sought and
received treatment.8
The supreme court could not reach unanimity on the appropriate
discipline for two lawyers who violated their duties of diligence and
communication. Russell William Pope essentially abandoned a client in
a child custody case and failed for over a year to prepare a consent order
to document an agreement in another custody dispute. 9 In a third
matter, Pope undertook to represent two clients in a personal injury
matter but let the statute of limitations expire.10 A majority of the
court voted to accept his petition for voluntary discipline of a six-month
suspension and noted that during the relevant time period Pope was
having significant marital difficulties.
Chief Justice Sears and
Presiding Justice Hunstein would have disbarred Pope under these
circumstances.12 In the other case, attorney Christine M. Livingston
received a one-year suspension for abandoning a real estate matter in
which she represented the mortgage company. 3 Livingston never
responded to the notice of discipline and thus admitted the allegations
against her. 4 A majority of the court, without elaboration, held that

3.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.4 (2001).

4. In re Edmunds, 284 Ga. 97,98,663 S.E.2d 182, 183 (2008). Edmunds also admitted
to one violation of Rule 1.15(II), GA. RULEs PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(II) (2001), for holding
the funds of a corporation in which he held an interest in his trust account. In re Edmunds,
284 Ga. at 99, 663 S.E.2d at 184.
5. In re Edmunds, 284 Ga. at 99, 663 S.E.2d at 184.
6. Id.
7. In re Stincer, 284 Ga. 451, 451-52, 668 S.E.2d 257, 257-58 (2008).
8. Id. at 451, 668 S.E.2d at 258.
9. In re Pope, 284 Ga. 156, 156, 663 S.E.2d 695, 695-96 (2008).
10.
11.

Id. at 156-57, 663 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 157, 663 S.E.2d at 696.

12. Id. (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting).
13. In re Livingston, 285 Ga. 173, 174, 674 S.E.2d 878, 879 (2009).
14. Id.

LEGAL ETHICS

2009]

233

a one-year suspension was the appropriate punishment." Chief Justice
Sears, Presiding Justice Hunstein, and Justice Thompson dissented on
the basis that the court should have disbarred Livingston under these
circumstances. 6
B.

FinancialImproprieties

During the survey period, the supreme court unanimously disbarred
The court's unanimity held
five lawyers for financial improprieties."
for two such cases that resulted in suspension rather than disbarment.
In one of these cases, the attorney took most of $45,000 in client funds
and converted them for his own use.'8 The attorney notified his client
and repaid the money, and the client continued to use the lawyer's
services. 9 Under those circumstances, and because the attorney had
no prior disciplinary history and was acting as a result of personal
problems "of a non-recurring nature," the court concluded that a sixmonth suspension was sufficient."° In the other case, the attorney
issued title insurance premiums after he terminated his relationship
with the insurer but kept the insurance forms and collected premiums.2
The attorney failed to account for the funds, withdrew them
from his trust account, and commingled personal funds with money in
his trust account.22 The supreme court noted the attorney's cooperation, remorse, and lack of prior discipline, and the court accepted a
petition for voluntary discipline of a one-year suspension, with numerous

15. Id.
16. Id. (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
17. In re Harris, 285 Ga. 412, 677 S.E.2d 131 (2009) (unexplained overdraft of
$32,692.64 on trust account); In re Winningham, 285 Ga. 175, 674 S.E.2d 877 (2009)
(converted $2000 of client money and commingled $28,000 of client funds with personal

funds); In re Landers, 285 Ga. 29, 673 S.E.2d 232 (2009) (received funds in a fiduciary
capacity in five real estate closings but did not notify third parties of his receipt of funds

in which they held interests, did not forward the funds to the appropriate parties, did not
maintain complete records regarding the funds, and did not maintain the funds separate
from his own); In re Richards, 284 Ga. 154,663 S.E.2d 708 (2008) (converted $8000 of client

money to his own use in one case and in another case did not account for settlement funds,
deducted more than the agreed-upon fee, and gave his client checks that were repeatedly
rejected for insufficient funds); In re Silvis, 283 Ga. 587, 663 S.E.2d 141 (2008) (failed to

turn over $28,000 and records of bankruptcy estate despite court order).
18.

In re Taylor, 284 Ga. 867, 867, 672 S.E.2d 653, 653-54 (2009).

19. Id. at 868-69, 672 S.E.2d at 654.
20. Id. at 868, 672 S.E.2d at 654.
21. In re Harste, 285 Ga. 80, 80, 673 S.E.2d 235, 236 (2009).

22. Id.
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conditions designed to ensure that the title insurance company received
what it was entitled to receive.23
Three cases involving financial improprieties provoked dissents.
Before he was admitted to the bar, Lester Christopher Solomon
undertook to manage the financial affairs of a disabled man.2' Solomon
took title to his ward's real property, secured a mortgage on it, and paid
the mortgage and a monthly stipend to himself out of the ward's annuity
income.' When Solomon became a member of the bar, he violated Rule
1. 15(I)26 when he did not separate his own funds from the funds of his
ward. The supreme court suspended Solomon from the practice of law
for six months," but Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justices Melton
and Thompson dissented on the ground that the suspension was insufficient.29 Justice Melton wrote the opinion and noted that Solomon had
an attorney-client relationship with the ward, yet sought to evict the
ward from his real property when a dispute between the two arose.3 °
The three dissenting justices did not state what punishment they would
have found appropriate.3 1
Gary Dale Simpson received a four-year suspension as a result of three
formal complaints against him.32 One complaint surfaced when
Simpson's trust account came up short by $300,000, and his records were
incomplete. He addressed the bank's concerns by beginning to repay the
bank and by cooperating with its requests for information. A second
complaint involved three checks on Simpson's trust account, totaling
about $3000, which were returned for insufficient funds. Simpson
reimbursed the parties for those checks. The third complaint resulted
from Simpson's failure, in a real estate transaction, to obtain title
insurance or file the warranty deeds. He eventually filed the deeds and
refunded the money that was supposed to be used for the insurance.3 3
The supreme court noted that Simpson had presented evidence that he
suffered from adult attention deficit disorder and executive dysfunction
and that this mental impairment, rather than any intent to violate the

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 81, 673 S.E.2d at 236.
In re Solomon, 284 Ga. 855, 856, 672 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2009).
Id.
GA. RuLEs OF PROFL CONDUC R. 1.15(II) (2001).

27. In re Solomon, 284 Ga. at 856, 672 S.E.2d at 663.
28. Id.
29. Id. (Melton, J., dissenting).

30. Id. at 857, 672 S.E.2d at 663.
31. See id. at 856-57, 672 S.E.2d at 663.
32. In re Simpson, 284 Ga. 446, 447, 668 S.E.2d 243, 244 (2008).

33. Id.
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rules, was the underlying cause of the problems. 34 The court suspended
Simpson for four years and imposed conditions upon his reinstatement.' Those conditions included proof that he is no longer impaired
and proof of continued restitution to the bank. 6 Presiding Justice
Hunstein dissented. 7 She would have disbarred Simpson because to
do otherwise was "detrimental to the public and to the legal profession."'
Jennifer Nicole Favors represented a personal injury client and
deposited the settlement funds into her escrow account.39 She used
some of the money for her own benefit and lied to her client about how
the funds had been used. She then lied to the Office of General Counsel
and the Investigative Panel about what happened and submitted to
them a falsified bank statement. Favors eventually admitted the
truth.4 ° A majority of the supreme court noted that she had shown
remorse, had no prior disciplinary history, and may have acted as a
result of personal and emotional factors for which she was seeking
counseling.4 ' The majority accepted a petition for voluntary discipline
and suspended Favors for three years.42 Chief Justice Sears, Presiding
Justice Hunstein,
and Justice Melton would have disbarred the
43
attorney.
C.

Criminal Convictions
The supreme court disbarred four lawyers as a result of felony
convictions and suspended one lawyer following a misdemeanor. Louis
Dante DiTrapano was disbarred, as a matter of reciprocity, after the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals disbarred him for pleading
guilty to the felonies of possessing firearms while being addicted to and
unlawfully using controlled substances." The Georgia Supreme Court
disbarred R. Scott Cunningham after he used his escrow account to help
a former client launder money; he was convicted of three federal
felonies.46 Ulysses Thomas Ware was sentenced in federal court to

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 447-48, 668 S.E.2d at 244.
Id.
Id. at 448, 668 S.E.2d at 244 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting).
Id.
In re Favors, 283 Ga. 588, 589, 662 S.E.2d 119, 119-20 (2008).
Id., 662 S.E.2d at 120.
Id.
Id. at 588-89, 662 S.E.2d at 119-20.
Id. at 590, 662 S.E.2d at 120 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting).
In re DiTrapano, 284 Ga. 628, 629, 670 S.E.2d 68, 68 (2008).
In re Cunningham, 284 Ga. 449, 669 S.E.2d 93, 93-94 (2008).
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ninety-seven months in prison for securities fraud and for conspiracy to
commit securities fraud, and the supreme court disbarred him." The
supreme court accepted the voluntary surrender of James F. Stovall's
license after he pled guilty to two federal felonies."' Anthony Brett
Williams received more lenient treatment after his misdemeanor
conviction for assisting his former boss, a district attorney, in a scheme
to obtain county money wrongfully." The supreme court suspended
Williams for six months and noted that he had no prior disciplinary
history, had pled guilty under the First Offender Act,49 and was
remorseful and cooperative. 0
D. Violations of Duties to Tribunals
During the survey period, four attorneys received discipline primarily
as a result of violations of their duties to tribunals. The supreme court
accepted the petition for voluntary discipline of Neil Lovett Wilkinson in
which he admitted that he negligently made or caused to be made false
statements to the Superior Court of Cobb County and the Georgia Court
of Appeals and that he negligently failed to correct those statements. 1
The supreme court ordered a public reprimand and a one-month
suspension. 2 The court also accepted a petition for voluntary discipline
in the case of John Alfred Roberts, who admitted that he filed a "Notice
of Suggestion of Bankruptcy" in a civil case two months before he
actually filed the bankruptcy petition.'
The court accepted that
Roberts acted negligently rather than purposefully in violating Georgia
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(4) 4 and suspended him for six
months for the violation.55 In another case, the court ordered a review
panel reprimand for an attorney who continued to defend a client in a
civil case when there was no defense.5 6 The attorney violated Georgia

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

In re Ware, 284 Ga. 444, 445, 667 S.E.2d 616, 616 (2008).
In re Stovall, 285 Ga. 48, 48, 673 S.E.2d 234, 234 (2009).
In re Williams, 284 Ga. 96, 96, 663 S.E.2d 181, 182 (2008).
O.C.GA §§ 42-8-60 to -66 (1997 & Supp. 2009).
In re Williams, 284 Ga. at 97, 663 S.E.2d at 182.
In re Wilkinson, 284 Ga. 548, 548-49, 668 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2008).
Id. at 549, 668 S.E.2d at 708.
In re Roberts, 284 Ga. 445, 445-46, 668 S.E.2d 256, 256-57 (2008).
54. GA. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(4) (2001).
55. In re Roberts, 284 Ga. at 445-46,668 S.E.2d at 256-57. Rule 8.4(aX4) provides that
it is misconduct for any lawyer to "engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a4).
56. In re Sims, No. S08Y1784, at 1 (Ga. Oct. 6, 2008), auailable at httpJ/www.gabar.
org/public/pdfDPublicDisciplinefS08Yl784simsRPR.pdf.
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Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1(a),5 7 which forbids a lawyer from
knowingly advancing a defense that would serve merely to harass or
M and Georgia
maliciously injure another,"
Rule of Professional Conduct
59
1.16(a)(1), which requires a lawyer to withdraw when continuing the
representation will result in the violation of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct.'
Finally, the supreme court disbarred an
attorney who advised two clients to perjure themselves in immigration
proceedings and submitted false statements, forged signatures, and false
death certificates in connection with the clients' applications for
asylum."'
E. Conflicts of Interest
The supreme court disciplined two lawyers for conflicts of interest.
The court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and suspended an
attorney for three years for actions that the petition and the court
treated as violations of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a),62
the rule on concurrent conflicts of interest."M The attorney took a
seventeen-year-old client to a motel and photographed her while she was
wearing only a towel." In accepting the petition and ordering the
suspension, the court noted that the attorney had no prior disciplinary
history, had achieved a favorable outcome for the client, had not sought
payment for his services, had not sought or had any additional contact
with the client, had been cooperative, and had agreed to pay for
counseling for the client if she needed it.'
The court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and reprimanded
an attorney who violated Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11, 66
which deals with conflicts of interest of government lawyers who enter
private practice. 7 The attorney had helped to prosecute a defendant
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1(a) (2001).
Id.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2001).
Id.; In re Sims, No. S08Y1784, at 1.
In re Harrison, 284 Ga. 442, 442-43, 668 S.E.2d 254, 255 (2008).

62.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2001).

63. Id.; In re McCalep, 283 Ga. 586, 586-87, 662 S.E.2d 120, 121 (2008). Rule 1.7(a)
states in relevant part that an attorney "shall not represent or continue to represent a
client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests... will materially and

adversely affect the representation of the client." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a).
64. In re McCalep, 283 Ga. at 586, 662 S.E.2d at 121.
65.
66.

Id. at 586-87, 662 S.E.2d at 121.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (2001).

67. Id.; In re Joshi, No. S09Y0429, at 1 (Ga. Feb. 23, 2009), available at http'//www.
gabar.orgpublicpdf/PublicDisciplineS09YO429JoshiPR.pdf. Rule 1.11 states, in relevant

part, that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
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and then, when he entered private practice, spoke with the defendant's
family about representing the defendant on appeal." The court did not
address the propriety of discipline in connection with the attorney's
statements to the family that certain witnesses at the defendant's
criminal trial had testified falsely.6 9
F

Other Cases
The supreme court took significant disciplinary action in several other
cases during the survey period. The court disbarred one attorney for
practicing law in Colorado without a license.70 The court disbarred
another attorney, as a matter of reciprocity, after Pennsylvania
disbarred him for violating his firm's partnership agreement when he
failed to report and remit fees. 7 In another case, the court accepted a
voluntary petition for discipline and ordered a public reprimand,
attendance at the Bar's ethics school, and quarterly assessments of the
attorney's intake procedures.72 The attorney failed to supervise a
paralegal who met clients at a chiropractor's office and who had the
clients sign a contingent fee agreement, and the attorney took action on
the clients' behalf without ever speaking to them.7 3 Another attorney
received a public reprimand for failing to ensure that only lawyers
conducted the Georgia real estate closings under her supervision.74 A
small percentage of the thousands of closings that her practice conducted
did not include lawyers. 75 Finally, the supreme court rejected a
petition for reinstatement from a lawyer who had been suspended with
conditions because the attorney failed to satisfy those conditions by
failing to provide a waiver to allow her psychiatrist to provide informa-

which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee,
unless the appropriate government entity consents after consultation." GA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11.

68. In re Joshi, No. S09Y0429, at 1.
69. Id. If this statement to the family was true, and the attorney knew the witnesses
were testifying falsely, then the attorney would have violated Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3(a)(4). See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2001). If the statement
to the family was false, and the lawyer knew it was false, then he violated Rule 8.4(a)(4).
See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(4).
70. In re Campbell, 284 Ga. 441, 441-42, 668 S.E.2d 253, 254 (2008).
71. In re Bramhall, 284 Ga. 448, 448, 667 S.E.2d 616, 616-17 (2008).
72. In re Stuhler, No. S08Y1349, at 1-2 (Ga. Mar. 9, 2009), available at httpJ/www.
gabar.org/public/pdf/PublicDiscipline/SO8Yl349stuhlerPR.pdf.
73. Id. at 1.
74. In re Dewrell, No. S09Y0143, at 1 (Ga. Jan. 26, 2009), available at httpj/www.
gabar.org/public/pdf/PublicDiscipline/SO9YO143DewrellPR.pdf.

75. Id.
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tion to the Bar and prove that she had continued treatment with a
board-certified psychiatrist during her suspension.7"
III.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals decided
dozens of cases during the survey period in which there were claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The courts routinely rejected most of
these claims. In the following cases, however, the appellate courts
rendered decisions that are noteworthy.
A.

Georgia Supreme Court

1. The Proper Standard for Ineffectiveness Claims. In Miller v.
State," the supreme court clarified the standard to be applied to claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.7" The standard has two prongs.79
First, the defendant must show some way in which the counsel's
representation was deficient." Representation is deficient if it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness. 8' The second prong
requires the defendant to show that "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. 8 2
In Miller the supreme court had to make the startling confession that
the appellate courts in Georgia had applied the wrong standard to the
second prong in numerous cases.83 In these cases from the court of
appeals and the supreme court, the courts applied a stricter test in
which the defendant had to make a showing that, but for the deficiencies
of counsel, the outcome of the case would have been different rather than
a showing of a reasonableprobabilitythat the outcome would have been
different.' The supreme court expressly disapproved of these cases.86
Because the court of appeals had applied this inappropriately strict

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

In re Lenn, 284 Ga. 671, 671-72, 670 S.E.2d 441, 441 (2008).
285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009).
See id. at 285, 676 S.E.2d at 174.
Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).
Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

81. See, e.g., Rayshad v. State, 295 Ga. App. 29, 36, 670 S.E.2d 849, 855 (2008) ("The
test for reasonable attorney performance is whether a reasonable lawyer at the trial could
have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.").
82. Miller, 285 Ga. at 286, 676 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 287, 676 S.E.2d at 175.
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standard in Miller, the supreme court remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct standard.'
2. Death Penalty Cases. In two cases, the supreme court
reinstated the death penalty after habeas courts found that the
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. In Hall v.
Brannan,7 the defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death
for murdering a Laurens County deputy sheriff after a traffic stop.'
Because there was no question that the defendant shot and killed the
officer, much of the testimony at trial concerned the defendant's history
of mental illness.' The habeas court found numerous instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel, most of which related to mental health
evidence.' With respect to each of the findings of the trial court, the
supreme court disagreed with the habeas court and held unanimously,
as a matter of law, that either trial counsel had not been deficient, that
any alleged deficiency had not prejudiced the defense, or that neither
prong of the test for ineffective assistance had been satisfied.91
In Schofield v. Cook,92 the defendant had been convicted of the
murders of two Mercer University students in 1995 and had been
sentenced to death. The habeas court concluded that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence of the defendant's mental health, in failing to investigate the defendant's background sufficiently, in failing to prepare the defendant's father
adequately to testify, and in failing to subpoena a witness in the
sentencing phase of the trial." The supreme court reversed the habeas
court on all counts and reinstated the death penalty.9'
In contrast, the supreme court upheld a habeas court's finding that the
defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of another death penalty case, Hall v. McPherson.95 The trial
court convicted the defendant of malice murder and sentenced him to
death. The habeas court vacated the death sentence because of trial
counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present evidence
regarding the defendant's history of childhood abuse and neglect and of

86. Id.
87. 284 Ga. 716, 670 S.E.2d 87 (2008).
88. Id. at 716-17, 670 S.E.2d at 91.

89. See id. at 718-21, 670 S.E.2d at 92-93.
90. Id. at 721-25, 670 S.E.2d at 93-96.
91. Id.
92.

284 Ga. 240, 663 S.E.2d 221 (2008).

93. Id. at 240-50, 663 S.E.2d at 224-30.
94. Id. at 241-51, 663 S.E.2d at 224-30.
95. 284 Ga. 219, 235, 663 S.E.2d 659, 670 (2008).

2009]
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the defendant's history of drug addiction and depression. 96 The
evidence at the habeas hearing showed that the defendant was abused
by his mother in numerous outrageous ways. Trial counsel, however,
relied primarily on the mother for information about the defendant's
upbringing and failed to hire a mitigation investigator or to follow
obvious leads that would have led to the truth about the history of
abuse.97 Furthermore, the supreme court agreed with the habeas court
that trial counsel was deficient in not seeking the defendant's medical
records from several facilities where he had sought treatment for his
drug addiction and mental illness.' Among other things, this evidence
would have tended to show that, because of the defendant's genetic
predisposition to addiction and his early childhood traumas, the
defendant had no choice about whether to develop the addictions from
which he suffered at the time of the murder.99 The supreme court
concluded "as a matter of law that there was a reasonable probability
that, were it not for trial counsel's deficient performance in investigating
and presenting mitigating evidence, at least one juror would have been
parole sentence.""° Justice
persuaded to vote for a life or life10without
1
Carley dissented without opinion.
3. Guilty Pleas. The supreme court decided two cases in which
defendants claimed to have received ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with their guilty pleas. In Cleveland v. State,' °2 the
defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute (among other crimes) and was sentenced to twenty years in
prison, with ten years to serve. He rejected a plea offer that would have
resulted only in probation and a fine. When he rejected the plea, the
defendant did not know that the prosecution intended to use particularly
damning evidence that was collected at his home. The defendant did not
know this because his trial counsel had not taken the time to review the
The
prosecution's file under the prosecutor's "open file" policy."°
supreme court held that the defendant had not shown prejudice from his
counsel's deficiency because there was no evidence from which the court
could infer that he would have pleaded guilty if he had known about the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 219-20, 663 S.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 222-23, 663 S.E.2d at 661-62.
Id. at 232-33, 663 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 230-31, 663 S.E.2d at 667.
Id. at 234, 663 S.E.2d at 669.
Id. at 235, 663 S.E.2d at 669.
285 Ga. 142, 674 S.E.2d 289 (2009).
Id. at 142-44, 674 S.E.2d at 290.
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evidence. 1°
' The defendant testified that he would have pleaded guilty
had he known, but the supreme court characterized that testimony as
self-serving and not credible in light of the defendant's persistent
10
insistence that he was not guilty."
Presiding Justice Hunstein filed a vigorous dissent and noted both the
defendant's need for professional assistance in evaluating a plea offer
and the overwhelming evidence of guilt that police had gathered at the
defendant's home."~ Presiding Justice Hunstein concluded that no
competent attorney would have advised a client in these circumstances
to reject probation and a fine in exchange for a guilty plea, and
that the defendant
accordingly Presiding Justice Hunstein concluded
107
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The supreme court reached the opposite result in Garrett v. State.10 8
In that case, the only evidence before the habeas court about the guilty
plea was the defendant's affidavit, in which he stated that he pleaded
guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute only
because his trial counsel told him, erroneously, that he could be
convicted simply because the drugs were in his car.1°9 Because there
was no evidence to the contrary, the supreme court reversed the decision
of the habeas court and granted habeas relief.1 0
4. Other Cases. The supreme court decided three other noteworthy
cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel. In Bass v. State,"'
the defendant was convicted after a trial in which the county sheriff
testified against him and then, with the express agreement of defense
counsel, served as bailiff for the duration of the trial. As bailiff, the
sheriff had a custodial relationship with the jury.112 The supreme
court reversed the court of appeals and concluded that the trial counsel's
failure to object was deficient performance and resulted in prejudice to
the defendant because the evidence was close and the sheriff's credibility
was important to the prosecution.113 Justice Carley dissented.114

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 147-48, 674 S.E.2d at 292-93.
Id.
Id. at 152-54, 674 S.E.2d at 296-97 (Hunstein, P.J., dissenting).
Id. at 154-55, 674 S.E.2d at 297-98.
284 Ga. 31, 663 S.E.2d 153 (2008).
Id. at 31-32, 663 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 32-33, 663 S.E.2d at 155.
285 Ga. 89, 674 S.E.2d 255 (2009).
Id. at 89-92, 674 S.E.2d at 255-57.
Id. at 93, 674 S.E.2d at 258.
Id. at 94, 674 S.E.2d at 258 (Carley, J., dissenting).
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In Reynolds v. State,"5 the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration." 6 The defendant
was convicted of aggravated battery in a trial in which the prosecutor
commented during closing argument on the defendant's failure to explain
his version of events to the police. The defendant's trial counsel failed
to object to this comment on the defendant's silence, and the court of
appeals concluded that a failure to do so was not deficient performance
because the prosecutor's comment under the circumstances was
The supreme court disagreed and overruled the cases upon
proper.1
which the lower court had relied." 8 The supreme court remanded,
presumably for consideration of the prejudice prong of the test for
ineffectiveness. 9
In another case involving a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's
silence prior to arrest, the supreme court held that the trial counsel's
failure to object was deficient performance, but that it did not prejudice
the defense in light of the weight of the evidence against the defendant. 2 ° In an odd concurrence, Justice Melton noted that, in his
opinion, the evidence against the defendant was of "questionable
strength." 2 ' Justice Melton expressed his "concern that harmless
error has become an escape route for any error created by the State's
inappropriate comments on a defendant's pre-arrest silence, regardless
of the proportional strength of the evidence presented of a defendant's
weakness
guilt."'22 Despite that concern, and despite his view of the
123
of the evidence, Justice Melton concurred in the judgment.
B.

Georgia Court of Appeals

1. Failures to Object. The court of appeals decided three cases
during the survey period that involved ineffective assistance of counsel
and the failure of trial counsel to object. In Walker v. State, 24 the
defendant was convicted of molesting three children. His conviction as
25
to one of the victims rested solely on the testimony of that victim.'

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (2009).
Id. at 72, 673 S.E.2d at 855.
Id. at 70-71, 673 S.E.2d at 854-55.
Id. at 72, 673 S.E.2d at 855.
Id.
Lampley v. State, 284 Ga. 37, 38-39, 663 S.E.2d 184, 186-87 (2008).
Id. at 42, 663 S.E.2d at 188 (Melton, J., concurring).
Id. at 41, 663 S.E.2d at 188.
Id. at 42, 663 S.E.2d at 188.
296 Ga. App. 531, 675 S.E.2d 270 (2009).
Id. at 531-32, 535, 675 S.E.2d at 271, 273.
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During trial, the victim's aunt testified that her reaction when the victim
told her about the molestation was, "I'm like now this child is telling me
the truth."'2 6 The court of appeals held that trial counsel was deficient
for not objecting to this opinion as to the truthfulness of the victim.'2 7
Given that the victim's testimony was the only admissible evidence as
to that part of the conviction, the court found there was prejudice and
as to that victim, based upon the ineffectiveoverturned the conviction
128
ness of trial counsel.
In Rayshad v. State,"2 the defendant was convicted of armed
robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping. i0 The defendant denied
participating in the crimes,"' and the evidence against him was not
overwhelming.'32 The court of appeals held that the defendant's trial
counsel made several significant errors during trial. 3 First, trial
counsel allowed the defendant to be impeached with a guilty plea to an
earlier crime that the defendant had entered under the First Offender
Act."a Second, trial counsel did not object to the admission of out-ofcourt statements made by the defendant's alleged co-conspirators after
the crimes had been committed."' Because of the timing of those
statements, they were not admissible as statements of a co-conspirator
and, therefore, were inadmissible hearsay."6 Failing to object to these
pieces of evidence was deficient performance. 137 Given the closeness
of the evidence and the centrality of the defendant's credibility, the court
of appeals held that the defendant had satisfied the prejudice prong as
well, and the court reversed the convictions." 8
In Cash v. State,'39 the defendant was convicted of aggravated child
molestation. 140 During trial, the father of the victim testified to what
the victim told him had transpired between her and the defendant. The
jury also heard a recording of an interview between the victim and an
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129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
S.E.2d
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 534, 675 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 535, 675 S.E.2d at 273.
Id.
295 Ga. App. 29, 670 S.E.2d 849 (2008).
Id. at 29, 670 S.E.2d at 851.
Id. at 31, 670 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 39, 670 S.E.2d at 857.
See id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-60 to -66 (1997 & Supp. 2009); Rayshad, 295 Ga. App. at 36, 670
at 855.
Rayshad, 295 Ga. App. at 36, 670 S.E.2d at 855.
Id. at 37, 670 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 37-38, 670 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 40, 670 S.E.2d at 858.
294 Ga. App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (2008).
Id. at 741, 669 S.E.2d at 732.
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investigator who worked for the sheriff's department. The defendant's
trial counsel did not object to any of this hearsay testimony."" The
court of appeals held that this failure to object was deficient performance
and, without explanation, concluded that the admission of these
statements resulted in harm to the defendant. 42 Presumably the
harm flowed from the fact that the key evidence in the case came from
the victim and the defendant, and each gave a different version of what
happened between them.'
The hearsay statements would have
tended to bolster the victim's version of the events and thus harmed the
defendant.'"
2. Failure to Inform. The court of appeals dealt with two cases
during the survey period that concerned the failure of attorneys to
inform their clients correctly. In Nejad v. State,'45 the defendant was
convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and other crimes. 146 The
defendant did not testify at trial. At the hearing on the motion for a
new trial, the defendant testified that he told his trial counsel he wanted
to testify, but his trial counsel did not tell him he had the right to do
so.1 47 In fact, his trial counsel confirmed this statement and added
more details to how he treated his client's right to testify:
During the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel unequivocally stated on several occasions that he told Nejad that he was not
testifying; that he ordered Nejad to inform the court that he was not

going to testify; that he told Nejad that he ruled with an iron fist and
that Nejad would have to do as instructed; that Nejad's family asked
about him testifying to explain the situation with the gun and he told
them that Nejad was not testifying; and that he did not advise Nejad
of his right to make the final decision about testifying at trial. Trial
counsel testified that he was proud of his reputation, but that he
wrongfully made the decision about whether Nejad would testify.'"

The court of appeals held that this was deficient performance. 149 The
defendant testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial about how,
if he had been allowed to testify, he could have explained or refuted the

141. Id. at 742-43, 669 S.E.2d at 732-33.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 746, 669 S.E.2d at 735.
See id.
Id.
296 Ga. App. 163, 674 S.E.2d 60 (2009).
Id. at 163, 674 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 167, 674 S.E.2d at 64.
Id. at 165, 674 S.E.2d at 62.
Id. at 167, 674 S.E.2d at 64.
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evidence against him. 5 ' The court held that the defendant suffered
prejudice as a result of trial counsel's deficiencies.'
In Fleming v. State,152 the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault even though the indictment was defective. The defendant did
not file a timely appeal and then filed a motion for an out-of-time
appeal, in which the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
The trial court initially denied the motion, but the court of appeals
remanded the claim for a determination of the ineffectiveness claim.
The trial court found counsel to have been ineffective because he did not
advise the defendant of the defendant's right to appeal.'5 3 The court
of appeals affirmed that result and then, on the merits, reversed the
conviction because the indictment was defective.'
IV. JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A.

GeorgiaSupreme Court
The Georgia Supreme Court decided one significant case regarding
judicial conduct during the survey period. In Cousins v. Macedonia
Baptist Church of Atlanta,55 the parties were litigating over control
of the church and its assets. The trial judge held a hearing on an
application for a temporary injunction, and counsel for the contesting
parties told the judge that they were ready to present witnesses and
documentary evidence. Rather than proceed in this fashion, however,
the judge first informally solicited the unsworn preferences of the church
members who attended the hearing about who should be in charge of the
church. The judge then ordered a recess during which the judge or his
staff made phone calls and obtained bank documents related to the
dispute. The judge called one of the parties to the stand, cross-examined

150. Id. at 167-68, 674 S.E.2d at 64.
151. Id. at 167, 674 S.E.2d at 64. Presiding Judge Smith wrote a concurrence that
bears mentioning. He noted that trial counsel had readily admitted to violating wellestablished law that entitled the defendant to decide whether or not to testify. Id. at 169,
674 S.E.2d at 65 (Smith, P.J., concurring). Judge Smith went on to suggest that counsel
may have been unaware of that law or instead may have testified untruthfully to help his
client with the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The concurring opinion
concludes, "The developing trend of emphatically and even eagerly testifying to one's own
incompetence or misconduct is dangerous to the administration of justice, particularly if
it is allowed to continue without any consequences for the testifying trial counsel." Id. at
170, 674 S.E.2d at 65.
152. 291 Ga. App. 787, 662 S.E.2d 861 (2008).
153. Id. at 787-88, 662 S.E.2d at 862-63.
154. Id.
155. 283 Ga. 570, 662 S.E.2d 533 (2008).
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him using the documents the judge obtained from the bank, and then
briefly called another witness. The judge then concluded the hearing
without affording any of the parties an opportunity to present evidence
or argument. The judge entered a permanent injunction and ordered the
first witness jailed for twenty days for contempt because the judge
determined that the witness was lying under oath."
The supreme
court reversed all of these rulings.'5 7 The supreme court held that the
judge's actions were "clearly improper" and reversed the rulings on the
merits of the case because the judge denied the parties their rights to
due process and access to the courts."M The supreme court described
the judge's role as that of an advocate rather than an arbiter and
criticized the ex parte communications in which the judge engaged.'6 9
As to the contempt citation, the court reversed the trial court because
the witness was never given a chance to defend himself or his testimony
and because the judge relied upon unsworn statements, unauthenticated
documents, and other information gathered by the judge ex parte.'60
B. Georgia Court of Appeals
The court of appeals decided five cases during the survey period
regarding judicial conduct. The court held that judges misbehaved in
three of the cases. In Wilson v. McNeely,'6 ' the court of appeals held
that a superior court judge should have recused herself because one of
the parties was a judge of a municipal court in one of the counties in the
superior court judge's circuit. 162 To preside over a case involving a
judge in the same circuit created an appearance of impropriety that
required recusal.'"'
The court disapproved of the actions of another judge who committed
reversible error in a sentencing hearing. 6 4 After the court of appeals
reversed the trial judge, the judge reimposed the original sentence but
he did so before the trial court had obtained jurisdiction. 5 Once the
judge obtained jurisdiction, he threatened to increase the sentence if the
defendant appealed again.'
The court of appeals described this

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 570-73, 662 S.E.2d at 534-36.
Id. at 574-75, 662 S.E.2d at 536-37.
Id. at 573-74, 662 S.E.2d at 536.
Id. at 574, 662 S.E.2d at 536.
Id. at 575, 662 S.E.2d at 537.
295 Ga. App. 41, 670 S.E.2d 846 (2008).
Id. at 43, 670 S.E.2d at 847-48.
Id. at 42-43, 670 S.E.2d at 847-48.

164.

Schilanger v. State, 297 Ga. App. 785, 678 S.E.2d 190 (2009).

165. Id. at 785-86, 678 S.E.2d at 191-92.
166. Id. at 787, 678 S.E.2d at 192.
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action as "rank error. " 1 7 The court noted that resentencing cannot be
conducted with vindictiveness, reversed the sentence again, and warned
that it would view any increase in sentence "with suspicion.""
In Gooch v. Tudor, 69 a contractor secured from a magistrate an
arrest warrant for a customer who disputed his bill. When the customer
sued for malicious prosecution, the contractor claimed immunity because
the magistrate found probable cause to issue the warrant. 170 The court
of appeals rejected this argument and noted with disapproval that the
magistrate did not act as a neutral party, but instead advised the
contractor on how to proceed, conducted several ex parte meetings with
the contractor about the matter, and
helped the contractor collect
171
payment in at least two other cases.
The court of appeals found no error in two other cases. In one, a
plaintiff in a slip and fall case appealed and sought a new trial because
a trial judge allegedly expressed an improper opinion. 172 The court of
appeals rejected this argument and noted that the trial judge, in one
instance, merely inquired into the relevance of one bit of testimony
without ruling it inadmissible.' 73 The other complaints concerned the
trial judge's comments in closing argument to the plaintiff's lawyer that
were made for the limited purpose of keeping the argument within
proper bounds and that did not express the judge's opinion about the
case. 74 The court of appeals
held that the judge acted properly and
175
affirmed the judgment.
In another case, a probate judge presided over a dispute between a
decedent's father and her ex-husband about which of them would be the
administrator of the decedent's estate. 76 The judge appointed a
guardian ad litem for the decedent's minor child, and then the judge
recused herself because she assisted the decedent's father with his
petition for letters of administration. The ex-husband lost the case and
argued on appeal that the appointment of the guardian ad litem by the
first judge was invalid. 177 The court rejected this argument and noted

167. Id.
168. Id. at 786-87, 678 S.E.2d at 192-93.
169.
170.
171.
172.
(2009).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

296 Ga. App. 414, 674 S.E.2d 331 (2009).
Id. at 415-17, 674 S.E.2d at 333-34.
Id. at 420, 674 S.E.2d at 336-37.
Muskett v. Sketchley Cleaners, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 561, 561, 677 S.E.2d 731, 732
Id. at 562, 677 S.E.2d at 733.
Id. at 562-63, 677 S.E.2d at 733.
Id. at 564-65, 677 S.E.2d at 734.
In re Estate of Sands-Kadel, 292 Ga. App. 343, 343-44, 665 S.E.2d 46, 47 (2008).
Id. at 344, 665 S.E.2d at 47-48.
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that the appointment was made before any motion for recusal had been
filed and that appointment of a guardian ad litem in such a case was
both necessary and appropriate.17
V. CONTEMPT
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two cases in which it applied
the standards and procedures for findings of contempt against attorneys,'7 9 as set forth by the Georgia Supreme Court in 2008. is In the
first case, the trial court held counsel in contempt for being disrespectful
to witnesses and the court, despite warnings to cease such behavior, and
for making a closing argument that threatened the jury and impugned
Because at least
the integrity of the court and the judicial process.'
some of the troublesome conduct was directed toward the judge and
because the trial judge delayed imposition of the punishment for
contempt, the court of appeals held that the contempt hearing should
have been held before a disinterested judge. 82 The court of appeals
vacated the order of contempt and remanded the case."s
In the other case, an attorney in a child deprivation hearing in
juvenile court announced she was ready for trial but then sought a
continuance to obtain documents she could have obtained earlier through
The attorney described her failure to obtain the docudiscovery"
ments as "ineffectiveness," and the judge asked her, "Ma'am, shall I hold
you in contempt for that?" The attorney replied, "I guess." The judge
then applied the court's own per se rule and held her in contempt,
stating that "an attorney who comes into my court and claims ineffective
assistance of counsel is going to be held in contempt of court. So I do
The court of
find you in contempt of court today, Ms. Morris.""
appeals noted that the attorney's conduct might have been a legitimate
basis for contempt, but reversed the order because the judge had not

178. Id. at 344-45, 665 S.E.2d at 48.
179. Morris v. State, 295 Ga. App. 579, 672 S.E.2d 531 (2009); Wilson v. McNeely, 295
Ga. App. 41, 670 S.E.2d 846 (2008).
180. In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 657 S.E.2d 830 (2008).
181. Wilson, 295 Ga. App. at 43, 670 S.E.2d at 848.
182. See id. at 43-44, 670 S.E.2d at 848.
183. Id. at 44, 670 S.E.2d at 849.
184. Morris, 295 Ga. App. at 580, 672 S.E.2d at 532-22.
185. Id. Note that this judge was not the only one during the survey period to express
the opinion that there should be consequences for an attorney who admits his or her own
ineffectiveness. See Nejad v. State, 296 Ga. App. 163, 169-70, 674 S.E.2d 60, 65 (2009)
(Smith, P.J., concurring).
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weighed the evidence properly; the judge applied an erroneous per se
standard.'86
VI.

ATTORNEY FEES

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two cases during the survey
period concerning attorney fees. In one case, the court of appeals
affirmed a trial court's decision to award attorney fees and expenses of
thirty percent of a common fund generated by attorneys on behalf of a
class of retirees.8 7 The court approved the procedure the trial court
followed, in which the court started with a benchmark percentage of
twenty-five percent and then upwardly adjusted the fee after analyzing
and explaining the factors upon which it relied in doing so.188 In
particular, the trial court noted the novelty and difficulty of the case, the
risk of zero recovery, and the results obtained for the class. 89
In another case, five heirs hired an attorney to help them contest a
will."9 Each challenger entered into a twenty-percent contingent fee
contract with the attorney. The challenge succeeded, but the attorney
sought to recover his contingent fee not from his clients (who were not
beneficiaries of the entire estate), but from the estate itself. The trial
court instead awarded the attorney a much lower fee based upon his
hourly rate and the time expended. 19' The court of appeals affirmed
the award and noted that the trial court implicitly found that a fee of
twenty percent of the entire estate would have been an unreasonable
fee. 192
VII.

SUITS AGAINST ATTORNEYS

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two noteworthy cases involving
suits against attorneys during the survey period. In Nash v. Studdard, 9' the court had the opportunity to discuss several issues that
arise in such cases. A client hired an attorney in a criminal matter and
paid a $5000 retainer. The client fired the lawyer, but the lawyer would
not return the retainer. The lawyer claimed to have worked a sufficient
number of hours on the case such that, at his hourly rate, he would have
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187.
(2009).
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Morris, 295 Ga. App. at 582, 672 S.E.2d at 534.
Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ga. v. Plymel, 296 Ga. App. 839,846-47,676 S.E.2d 234,241
Id.
Id. at 846, 676 S.E.2d at 241.
In re Estate of Boss, 293 Ga. App. 769, 769, 668 S.E.2d 283, 284 (2008).
Id. at 769-70, 668 S.E.2d at 284.
Id. at 772 & n.l, 668 S.E.2d at 286 & n.11.
294 Ga. App. 845, 670 S.E.2d 508 (2008).
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more than earned the fee. The former client sued the lawyer on a
number of theories." The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the attorney on a breach of fiduciary duty claim-based on
failure to communicate trial strategy-because the client presented no
evidence of damages.195 The court also affirmed summary judgment
on a claim that the lawyer breached a fiduciary duty by not returning
the retainer fee.'
The court noted that although nonrefundable fee
contracts are invalid in Georgia and unearned fees must be returned if
the client fires the lawyer, the former client in this case presented no
evidence that any of the fee was unearned." 9 Finally, the court of
appeals held that the trial court should have granted summary judgment
to the lawyer on the client's breach of contract claim, but only to the
extent that the breach would involve the exercise of professional
judgment."g The plaintiff had not elaborated on how the attorney
breached a contract."' To the extent that breach involved the exercise
of professional judgment, the plaintiff was obligated to provide an expert
affidavit attesting to the breach.2' ° Because the plaintiff did not do so,
any such claim had to be dismissed.20 1 To the extent, however, that
the alleged breach of contract did not involve professional judgment, the
claim would survive without an expert affidavit.2 °2
In Rommelman v. Hoyt," 3 an attorney represented a decedent's wife
in a wrongful death action. The attorney settled the case and received
a forty-percent contingent fee. Under the law, two of the decedent's
children from a previous marriage were entitled to part of the settlement, and they alleged that their stepmother did not pay them. These
children and their mother, the decedent's ex-wife, sued the lawyer and,
among other claims, sought to recover the lawyer's fee under a theory of
unjust enrichment.2 "4 The trial court granted partial summary
judgment for the attorney, and the court of appeals affirmed.0 5 The
court of appeals observed that the theory of unjust enrichment applies

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 846-47, 670 S.E.2d at 511-12.
Id. at 850, 670 S.E.2d at 514.
Id. at 851, 670 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 850-51, 670 S.E.2d at 514-15.
Id. at 853-54, 670 S.E.2d at 516-17.
Id. at 853, 670 S.E.2d at 516.
Id.
Id. at 853-54, 670 S.E.2d at 516.
Id. at 853, 670 S.E.2d at 516.
295 Ga. App. 19, 670 S.E.2d 808 (2008).
Id. at 20, 670 S.E.2d at 809-10.
Id., 670 S.E.2d at 810.
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when a party has conferred a benefit on another party.2°6 Here, the
court held, the ex-wife and her children provided no benefit to the
attorney and had no legal right to participate in the wrongful death
suit.' Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment
for the attorney on their claims for unjust enrichment.'
VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS MATrERS

Several additional decisions during the survey period related to
questions of legal ethics in Georgia. In Hargett v. State,2' the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed murder convictions,2 10 but Chief Justice Sears

concurred to note an instance of what she believed was prosecutorial
misconduct.2 ' A defense witness testified that one of the defendants
was with her when the crimes occurred. At the close of that day's
testimony, the witness was arrested and charged with pejury. The next
day, the witness changed her story and testified that the defendant was
not with her at the relevant time.212 Oddly, Chief Justice Sears
concluded that this prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant 21of
due process of law but, nevertheless, voted to affirm the convictions.
In another case, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the
Georgia Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants to deny admission
to an applicant who was convicted of crimes in the 1980s. 214 The court

concluded that the applicant had not carried his burden of demonstrating that he had rehabilitated himself and noted particularly that the
applicant misrepresented the circumstances of the crime when he sought
an early release from prison, when he applied
to college, and when he
215
first applied for a certification of fitness.
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction of John Sawhill for the
crime of practicing law without a license.216 Sawhill contacted an outof-state probationer and offered to assist him with making his probation
payments. Sawhill called the probation officer and stated that he was
representing the probationer. When the probationer sent Sawhill $800
to use for his fee and for partial payment of probation fees, Sawhill

206. Id.
207.

Id. at 20-21, 670 S.E.2d at 810.

208. Id. at 20, 670 S.E.2d at 810.
209.

285 Ga. 82, 674 S.E.2d 261 (2009).

210. Id. at 82, 674 S.E.2d at 263.
211. Id. at 89, 674 S.E.2d at 268 (Sears, C.J., concurring).
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 88, 674 S.E.2d at 267 (majority opinion).
Id. at 89, 674 S.E.2d at 268 (Sears, C.J., concurring).
In re Cook, 284 Ga. 575, 668 S.E.2d 665 (2008).

215. Id. at 576, 668 S.E.2d at 666.
216. Sawhill v. State, 292 Ga. App. 438, 438, 665 S.E.2d 353, 353 (2008).
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ceased communicating with the probationer and apparently pocketed the
$800.217 The court of appeals held that this evidence was sufficient to
convict Sawhill of the unauthorized practice of law.2 1
Finally, the supreme court adopted one opinion of the State Bar of
Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board (the Board).2 19 The Board
addressed the following question: "May an attorney ethically defend a
client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with
a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client?" 220
The Board addressed two scenarios.22 ' In one scenario, the attorney
has two clients.222 The attorney represents an insured and seeks to

At the same
avoid or minimize any judgment against the insured.'
through
seeks,
that
time, the lawyer represents an insurance company
a right of subrogation, to receive all or part of a judgment against the insured.224 The attorney's successful representation of the insured, in
other words, would be to the direct disadvantage of the lawyer's other
client.2" The Board determined that this situation, under Georgia
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, 226 presents an unconsentable conflict.2 27 The Board also dealt with the much more common situation
in which the lawyer does not represent the insurance company seeking
subrogation but does have reason to want to please that company
because that insurance company sends the lawyer business. 22s

The

Board concluded that this situation presents a conflict of interest
between the lawyer's loyalty to the insured client and the lawyer's own
interest in maintaining a good relationship with the insurance company
This conflict could be cured by informed
seeking subrogation. 2 '

217.

Id. at 438-39, 665 S.E.2d at 354.

218. Id. at 439, 665 S.E.2d at 354 (citing O.C.GA. § 15-19-51(a) (2008) (making it a
crime to practice law without a license)).
219. Formal Advisory Op. 05-11, 284 Ga. 283, 667 S.E.2d 93 (2008). Other activities

of the Board are described in STATE BAR OF GEORGIA REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL 8-11 (2009), available at http//www.gabar.org/public/pdf/OGC/
OGCReport_0809.pdf.
220. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 05-11 (2008), available at http'//gabar.org
/handbook/supreme-courtof georgia/fao_05-11/.

221. Id.
222. Id.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001).

227. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., supra note 219.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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consent of all affected clients unless it "involves circumstances rendering
it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate
representation to one or more of the affected clients."23
IX.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers and judges look to appellate decisions for guidance about
their ethical and professional responsibilities.
This Article has
highlighted the guidance the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia
Court of Appeals provided during the survey period.

230. Id. (quoting GA. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.7(c)).

